When they arrived, rather than just dropping her off, the young man invited himself in.
Uncomfortable being alone with him, she said she was sleepy and feigned a yawn. He moved towards her, attempting to flirt, she thought, and suddenly started tickling her.
That same day in Miami, Jennifer Scott, 47, went to court for the flip side of that judicial ruling: Now Florida also must let gay and lesbian couples divorce. "It let all the angst, frustration and anxiety that was lying under the surface for six years finally be released.'' Until Tuesday, same-sex couples were trapped in a legal limbo sometimes known in gay and lesbian circles as "wed-lock." They had married in other states, but Florida considered their union illegal, and would not divorce them.
A sharp-tongued, witty young woman with cascading brown hair, Olivia packed up and drove 2,200 miles from home to one of the nation’s driest and most desolate national parks.
One evening, about three weeks in, she asked her 21-year-old housemate, who also worked for the National Park Service, for a ride to a coworker’s house several miles up the desert road, where she was housesitting for the weekend.
After leaving to attend Cornell University and Harvard Law School, she returned to Miami where she started her career at private law firms.
She was elected to the Office of State Attorney five times.
She tried to wriggle free, pushing him several times, but he grabbed her and wouldn’t let go.
Then, to her horror, he shoved her to the floor and pinned her down. Olivia, whose name has been changed to protect her identity, tells me about the incident as we sit at the kitchen table in her roomy Death Valley apartment, a mile from her old dorm as the crow flies.
TN 31 (09-16)Date: June 1, 2016 The number holder (NH) was domiciled in Florida when he filed for child Insurance benefits (CIB) on the claimant’s behalf; therefore, we look to Florida intestacy law to determine whether the claimant is the NH’s child. Thus, if there is evidence that the NH and Aissa consented in writing to the insemination, the NH is presumed to be the twins' father, and this presumption cannot be rebutted by additional evidence. The Florida court has not changed its ruling that the child is the NH's legitimate child.
The information provided does not indicate that NH ever participated in a marriage ceremony with claimant’s mother. If, however, the NH and Aissa did not consent in writing to the insemination, further examination of Florida law is required. If the child is recognized as the NH's legitimate child under Florida law, he would be the NH's child under Tennessee law.
Therefore, section 216(h)(2)(B) of the Act does not apply to this matter. Historically, Florida's common law viewed any action challenging a child's legitimacy with great disfavor. Based on Florida case law, the child is the NH's legitimate child as a result of the divorce judgment.
The evidence also does not establish that the claimant is NH’s child under section 216(h)(3)(A) of the Act. An individual who provided a written acknowledgment of paternity may disestablish paternity under Florida Statutes § 742.10(4) or § 742.18. Therefore, the child is his child for purposes of intestate inheritance rights and is entitled to child's benefits pursuant to section 216(h)(2)(A) of the Act.
If a claimant has been entitled to benefits as the child of an insured individual, a later determination that another man is the child’s biological father is not a terminating event under the Act. Theodore was born on September XX, 1983, during S~'s marriage to B~. In our opinion, Theodore is not entitled to child's benefits pursuant to 42 U. Nevertheless, because Theodore is S~'s legitimate child as a result of the divorce judgment, Theodore is deemed to be S~'s child for purposes of intestate inheritance rights, and is entitled to child's benefits pursuant to the provisions of 42 U. In 1984, the mother filed for divorce with a Florida circuit court, and the NH filed a counter-petition contesting paternity.